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Comment
A New Proposal: Buyer Notification Under
U.C.C. Section 9-307(1) Based on the Food
Security Act of 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem Case
In 1976, Dan Holland bought a tractor in Florida.' To insure
repayment of the $13,000 loan, the lending bank retained a security
interest 2 in the tractor.3 Before Holland satisfied the debt, he sold
the tractor to a dealership in Iowa in violation of the bank's secur-
ity agreement.4 Unaware of the encumbrance, a Montana resident
purchased the tractor from the dealership.5 When Holland de-
faulted on his obligation, the bank located the tractor in Montana
and repossessed it.6 Noting the hardship on the Montana buyer,
the Montana Supreme Court stated:
This Court recognizes that this is a harsh result, since the pur-
chaser, on the date of purchase in Iowa, had no means to learn in
Iowa that the property he purchased was subject to a security
interest. It may be that legislative action is necessary to prevent
such results in the future. Since we are bound by the enacted
laws .... no other course is open to us here.7
B. The General Rule
A creditor obtains initial rights in collateral through a security
agreement.8 The security agreement creates a property interest in
1. Exchange Bank of Osceola v. Jarret, 180 Mont. 33, 34, 588 P.2d 1006, 1007, 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 877, 878 (1979).
2. Section 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "U.C.C.") provides: "'Se-
curity interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978).
3. Exchange Bank, 180 Mont. at 34, 588 P.2d at 1007, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) at 878.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 37, 588 P.2d at 1009, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 880.
6. Id. at 34, 588 P.2d at 1007, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 878.
7. Id. at 39, 588 P.2d at 1009, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 882.
8. U.C.C. section 9-203(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a security interest is not
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the collateral,9 and enables the holder of the interest to repossess
the property specifically earmarked in the agreement.' 0 As a gen-
eral rule, the right to repossess may be enforced not only against a
debtor, but also against subsequent purchasers of the collateral."
Accordingly, the risk of losing purchased goods shifts to the buyer
in the event of debtor default.' 2 Faced with the prospect of debtor
default, a buyer should seek to protect his ownership of used
merchandise.
enforceable until the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (1978).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978). For the relevant text of section 1-201(37), see supra
note 2.
10. Section 9-503 provides: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace . .. ."
U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). See also, D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
197 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter EPSTEIN] (quoting Davenport, Default, Enforcement and
Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U.L. REV.
265, 267 (1973)).
11. U.C.C. section 9-201 states: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the
collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978).
12. If a debtor does not default, no repossession occurs and the buyer suffers no ac-
tual loss. There is, however, always the potential of debtor default. Upon purchase, the
"risk" of losing collateral shifts to a buyer and remains with the buyer as long as the
security interest is unsatisfied. This "risk shift" originates in the security agreement it-
self, because section 9-201 states that a security agreement is effective between the debtor
and creditor, and against subsequent purchasers of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978).
Professor Dugan comments about the security agreement:
It is a strange world indeed where a lender [through the security agreement] can
shift the risk of the borrower's insolvency or perfidy to a third party whose only
involvement is the purchase of goods in the ordinary course of business.. . . the
risk shift originates in the contract but violates the fundamental axiom that a
contract can bind only the parties thereto. Viewed as a restraint upon aliena-
tion, it violates the equally fundamental principal that such restraints shall not
operate in complete secrecy.
Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 333, 344-45 (1975) [hereinafter Dugan].
Opposition to the secrecy of the security agreement has been met by the requirement
that the debtor-creditor arrangement be given a degree of public notoriety. I P. COOGAN,
W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.02[2], at 1-8 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter COOGAN]. Public
notice protects third parties from dealing with the debtor on the assumption that the
debtor fully owns the goods in which the secured party claims an interest. COOGAN,
supra note 12. The requirement for some sort of public notice can be traced back to
Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811 (1601) ("[Sjome of... [the sheep] he sold; and he
shore the sheep, and marked them with his own mark. . . ."). COOGAN, supra note 12, at
1-8 n.18.
Sections 9-401 through 9-408 comprise the notice-filing system of Article 9. U.C.C.
§§ 9-401 to 9-408 (1978). Notice-filing involves "perfection" of the security interest. In
re Certified Packaging, hic., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 95 (Bankr. D. Utah 1970),
provided the following description of "perfection":
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A buyer's ability to protect his interest requires at least an
awareness of a creditor's lien.' 3 To notify buyers of immediate
creditor interests, Congress provided a system of buyer notification
under a recent federal statute, the Food Security Act of 1985.' 4
The federal statute is limited to situations in which farm products
serve as collateral. '1 This Comment proposes extending notifica-
tion requirements to other buyer transactions. Specifically, the
writer would impose a notification requirement when nonmerchant
buyers'6 purchase used goods1 7 subject to certain creditor security
One must distinguish the concept of security "attachment" from the concept of
security "perfection" under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The first concept deals with those steps legally required under the act to give
the secured party an interest in the subject property effective as against the
debtor.
The second concept deals with those steps legally required under the Act to
give the secured party an interest in the subject property effective as against the
world.
Id. at 99 (emphasis added). Perfection ordinarily requires the creditor to perform some
step in addition to attachment, either taking possession of the collateral or filing a record
in a public office. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 218. "Perfection" is designed to "oil the
wheels of commerce by placing information in a public place" or some other action which
would alert a member of the public about the outstanding right in the property held by
the creditor. In re Certified Packaging, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 100.
The problem addressed in this Comment is limited to sales involving perfected security
interests. When a security interest is unperfected, it will be cut off in any sale to a buyer
not in the ordinary course of business. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c) (1978). Compare infra notes
23-40 and accompanying text (defining a "buyer in ordinary course of business").
13. A "lien creditor" is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved
by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors . .. ."
U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1978). Although Article 9 distinguishes between a lien creditor and a
creditor with a security interest, this Comment will use the term "lien" to include a
security interest.
14. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. III 1985) (effective Dec. 23, 1986).
15. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). U.C.C. section 9-109(3) defines "farm
products" to include:
[C]rops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if
they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as
ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the
possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming
operations. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor
inventory.
U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1978).
16. A person buying under section 9-307(1) need not be a consumer of goods and
may actually be a dealer who will in turn place goods in his own inventory for resale. 9
W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-
307:02, at 72 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter HAWKLAND]. Presumably, merchants and deal-
ers are sophisticated and understand the notice-filing system of Article 9. In this Com-
ment, therefore, a "nonmerchant buyer" refers only to consumers and those business
persons whose purchase of merchandise is infrequent and not intended for resale.
Whether a business person qualifies as a nonmerchant buyer would be dependent on
the characteristics and circumstances of each case. Generally, this author proposes a two
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interests.
II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT BUYER PROTECTION UNDER
SECTION 9-307(1)
The general rule that a security agreement is effective against
purchasers is limited by section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (the "U.C.C." or the "Code"). Section 9-307(1)
provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section
1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.' 8
Subsection (1) of section 9-307 offers the buying public some pro-
tection from a security interest held by a seller's creditor.' 9
The policy behind the section 9-307(1) exception is to allow buy-
ers to feel confident that their ownership of purchased goods will
remain undisturbed. 20  A buyer would be reluctant to buy mer-
prong analysis. It should first be determined whether a business-buyer possessed an "in-
tent to resell." This would be a subjective analysis which looks to the thoughts of the
buyer at the time of purchase. Second, it should be established whether a business-buyer
purchased a particular item often. This would be an objective analysis which looks to
specific merchandise and the frequency of its purchase measured over a given interval of
time.
17. "Used goods" may be misperceived to refer only to goods that have substantially
decreased in value or have been in the current buyer's hands for some time before even-
tual resale. The term "used goods" in this Comment, however, simply refers to any col-
lateral that has gone through a transaction involving a prior buyer. A secured party is
never a buyer because security transferred in satisfaction of a debt is not "buying." See
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
The following transactions took place in Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 380
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), within just afew months: (1) Case Co. ("CC") sold a tractor to
Florida Tractor Mart ("FTM"), and took a security interest in the tractor; (2) FTM
delivered the tractor to Gator Tractor ("GT") pursuant to an oral lease; (3) GT sold the
tractor to Swift Ford Tractor ("Swift") for $5,600. To summarize, CC sold to FTM;
FTM leased to GT; GT sold to Swift. A buyer from Swift would be a buyer of "used
goods" for the purposes of this Comment.
18. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978) (emphasis added).
19. McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 624, 273 A.2d
198, 209, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 766, 782 (1971).
20. In re Kline, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 628, 634 (E.D. Pa. 1956). The
purpose of section 9-307(1) "was to facilitate the movement or transfer of goods at the
retail level from merchant to consumer." Id. "Any routine off-the-shelf purchase of in-
ventory severs existing security interests granted by the seller. Were it otherwise, you
would need a lawyer at your elbow in making any routine purchase. A plainly intolerable
situation, which is ruled out by 9-307(1)." T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEsT 9-307[A][5], at S9-296 (Supp. 1 1987) [hereinafter
QUINN].
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chandise if a secured lender could take goods from him in order to
satisfy a seller's debt. 21 In essence, section 9-307(1) recognizes that
a buyer will equate a merchant's possession or other evidence of
ownership with an ability to sell goods free and clear of creditors'
interests.22
The protection afforded a purchaser under section 9-307(1),
however, is limited. The buyer must qualify as a "buyer in the
ordinary course of business. ' 23 Under section 1-201(9), a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" means a person who (1) in good
faith and (2) without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of a security interest, (3) buys from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind.24
A. The Meaning of "Buyer in Ordinary Course"
First, a "buyer in ordinary course" must purchase in "good
faith."' 25 The U.C.C. defines good faith for a nonmerchant buyer
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. '2 6
21. "The purpose of sec. 307(1) of Article 9 ... is to protect consumers." Antigo Co-
op Credit Union v. Miller, 86 Wis. 2d 90, 98, 271 N.W.2d 642, 646, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 326, 332 (1978). See also Note, Sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: The Requirement of Buying From a Person in the Business of
Selling Goods of That Kind, 58 IND. L.J. 335, 339 (1982).
22. The basic principle embodied in section 9-307(1) is equitable estoppel. Note,
supra note 21, at 340 (citing 3 J. POMPEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 801-821 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941)). One reason for protecting the innocent purchaser
is that the creditor set in motion the chain of events leading to the title dispute by entrust-
ing the collateral to a dealer. Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter, 733 P.2d 1024, 1028
(Wyo. 1987). It is well settled that a creditor, by his conduct, may be estopped from
denying the seller's authority to sell. Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 111. 432, 434, 149
N.E. 225, 225-26 (1925)(applying the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT, superseded
by U.C.C. Article 9). See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 26.3, at 686-88 (1965) [hereinafter GILMORE]. "Owners of chattels must fre-
quently intrust others with their possession, and the affairs of men could not be
conducted unless they could do so with safety, so long as the possession of the chattel is
not accompanied by some indicium of ownership or the right to sell." Sherer-Gillett Co.,
318 I11. at 435, 149 N.E. at 226.
23. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978). U.C.C. section 1-201(9) defines a "buyer in ordinary
course" as:
[A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the
goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
24. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
25. Id.
26. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978). See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290
A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 523 (Del. 1972). The definition of good faith
in section 1-201(19) determines whether a buyer of goods subject to a security interest
acted in good faith within the meaning of section 9-307(1). Id. at 650, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
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This good faith inquiry is a subjective test that focuses on the mind
and thoughts of a purchaser. A buyer will be deemed to have
purchased in good faith if he had a reasonable and honest convic-
tion that he purchased the goods in a legitimate transaction free of
all liens.28 Whether there is anything to make the buyer suspicious
of the transaction is a question of fact to be determined in light of
all circumstances surrounding the sale.29 Presumably, suspicion
must amount to "actual knowledge" to constitute bad faith, 0 be-
cause the Code uses the term "knowledge" to mean knowledge in
fact, not mere constructive notice.3'
A "buyer in ordinary course" also must buy without knowledge
that the sale to him is in violation of a security interest in the
goods. 32 The Official Code Comment to section 9-307 explains that
a buyer takes free of an encumbrance if he knows only that there is
a security interest which covers the goods he is about to
purchase.13 If the buyer also knows that the seller is exceeding his
authority in violation of some term in the security agreement, the
buyer will take subject to the security interest.34 Ordinarily, a
nonmerchant purchaser will have little difficulty in satisfying the
limited knowledge provision of section 9-307(1), because he will
not know anything about security interests, let alone any specific
term of a security agreement."
Serv. (Callaghan) at 526. See also Frank Davis Buick AMC-Jeep, Inc. v. First Alabama
Bank of Huntsville, N.A., 423 So. 2d 855, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 249 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1982). Because Article 1 is applicable to the entire Code unless otherwise
provided, Article 9, which does not have its own definition of good faith, will employ the
good faith definition contained in Article 1, section 1-201(19), rather than the good faith
definition of Article 2, relating to sales. Id. at 858, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
255.
27. Frank Davis, 423 So. 2d at 858, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 255.
28. Dion v. Silver City Dodge, Inc., 398 Mass. 58, 61, 495 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1986).
29. In re Del Tex Corp., 32 Bankr. 403, 407, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 317,
322-23 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983). See also Sebrite Corp. v. Tramsouth Financial Corp.,
272 S.C. 483, 487, 252 S.E.2d 873, 875, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 544, 547
(1979).
30. Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey National Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 752, 27
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1153, 1163 (3rd Cir. 1979).
31. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1978).
32. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
33. U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2, para. 1 (1978).
34. Id. For a buyer not to be a buyer in ordinary course, he must know that a se-
cured party has rights in the goods and that the sale is in violation of those rights. In re
Woods, 25 Bankr. 924, 931, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 256, 267 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982). A purchaser who knows that someone is owed money, but does not know
that the sale was in violation of a bank's rights is still a buyer in ordinary course. Id.
35. A nonmerchant buyer usually purchases without knowing that the sale is in viola-
tion of a security agreement. In Quinn v. Scheu, 66 Or. App. 644, 648, 675 P.2d 1078,
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The third factor in the definition of a "buyer in ordinary course"
is that one must buy from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind,36 for example, a dealer or merchant. 7 A merchant
within the meaning of section 9-307(1) may be defined as one who
engages in a systematic economic enterprise .3  This definition ex-
cludes isolated sales incidental to the seller's primary business. 9
1081, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 367, 370 (1984), however, the Oregon Appellate
Court found a buyer had such knowledge. In Quinn, the secured party sent an invoice
and letter informing the buyer of its security interest. Id. at 646-47, 675 P.2d at 1080, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 368. The buyer contacted his publisher (seller) and was
told to ignore the matter. Id. Because the secured party had an interest in the publisher's
accounts and inventory, the secured party was able to seize the buyer's books because of
the publisher's default. Id. The Oregon Court concluded that when the buyer received
the invoice and letter, he should have investigated the nature of the secured party's rights.
Id. at 648, 675 P.2d at 1081, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 370.
36. Whether one is "in the business of selling goods of that kind" is a factual determi-
nation; factors may include advertisement and demonstration of the product, intent to
resell, sales documentation, and prior sales of the product. In re Fiesta Corp., 25 Bankr.
236, 239, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1738, 1743 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982). From a
matrix of facts, the question becomes whether the public could have reasonably expected
the sale to be part of an ongoing business. Id. at 240, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
1743. For example, in Kaw Valley State Bank v. Stanley, 514 S.W.2d 42, 44-45, 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 514, 515-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), the Missouri Appellate
Court found that the public would have expected a seller, who used his home as an office
for his "part time occupation," to be in the business of selling boats when the seller used
business cards and advertised his business name at a local shopping center.
37. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978). When the seller is not a merchant, U.C.C. section 9-
307(2) affords a used goods buyer protection from a perfected security interest. (A secur-
ity interest in consumer goods is perfected without filing; perfection is automatic. U.C.C.
§ 9-302(l)(d) (1978).) Under section 9-307(2), however, both the buyer and seller must
be consumers. HAWKLAND, supra note 16, § 9-307:04, at 78.
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest even
though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value
and for his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to the
purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1978) (emphasis added). Although the section 9-307(2) exception
seems fairly broad, it works to protect a very limited group of purchasers because it
applies solely to inter-consumer sales. HAWKLAND, supra note 16, § 9-307:04, at 78. The
inter-consumer restriction comes from the prepositional phrase "[iun the case of con-
sumer goods." New England Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Auto Owners Fi-
nance Co., 355 Mass. 487, 488-89, 245 N.E.2d 437, 438, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
58, 59 (1969). As a result of this inter-consumer limitation in 9-307(2), the sale is not
one by a dealer, but by John Smith to a neighbor. "That, in itself, cuts down 9-307(2) to
pygmy size." QUINN, supra note 20, 9-307[A][4], at 9-188 (1978).
38. Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 228,
230, 327 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Sindone v. Farber, 105 Misc. 2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980). When car towing firm A sold towing equipment to B, B was not a buyer in the
ordinary course of business under section 1-201(9) because A was not a "person in the
business of selling goods of that kind." Id. at 639, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 781. A's regular
business was towing vehicles, not selling towing equipment. Id.
The term, "one who deals in selling goods of that kind" also makes a distinction be-
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Ultimately, "selling goods of that kind" turns on whether the
goods purchased are a regular part of the merchant's selling
inventory.'
B. Buyer Takes Free Only of a Security Interest
"Created by His Seller"
If the buyer satisfies the "buyer in ordinary course" definition,
he must overcome one more hurdle before he can qualify for pro-
tection under section 9-307(1) and take free of a security interest.
A buyer can take free of a security interest only if the interest is
"created by his seller."' 4 ' The phrase "created by his seller" refers
only to a security interest given by the debtor-seller.4 2 The Official
Code Comment to section 9-307 specifically provides: "The limita-
tions which this section imposes on the persons who may take free
of a security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by
the debtor. '43
tween merchants who sell and those who lease. In United Carolina Bank v. Capital Au-
tomobile Co., 163 Ga. App. 796, 294 S.E.2d 661, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1705
(1982), a leasing company was found not to be in the business of "selling" cars. Sales
were merely incidental to the business of leasing. Therefore, the purchaser did not buy
from a person who deals in selling goods of that kind and was not a buyer in ordinary
course. Id. at 798, 294 S.E.2d at 663, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1707.
40. Sindone, 105 Misc. 2d at 638, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 781. Section 9-307(1) applies to
sales out of inventory by a person selling goods of that kind. First Dallas County Bank v.
G.M.A.C., 425 So. 2d 464, 466, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 701, 703 (Ala. 1983).
Section 9-307(1) applies primarily to the sale of inventory, because section 1-201(9) re-
quires the seller to be in the business of "selling goods"; goods held for sale are "inven-
tory" under section 9-109(4). Id. at 466, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 703. See
also U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 9-109(4) (1978).
41. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978).
42. Ocean City National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 515, 457 A.2d 1225,
1228, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 310, 315 (1983).
43. U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2, para. 2 (1978) (emphasis added). Section 9-307(1)
applies solely to unauthorized sales by the debtor. When a sale has been authorized by a
creditor, however, section 9-306(2) will apply, and a buyer will be able to purchase collat-
eral unencumbered. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-12, at 1066 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE &
SUMMERS]. Section 9-306(2) states:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections
received by the debtor.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978) (emphasis added). A merchant's ability to sell collateral free of
a security interest may occur in one of two ways. First, authorization may be effected
through the security agreement itself. A creditor may specifically allow a merchant to
sell inventory to its customers, and according to the terms of the agreement, will expect
the loan to be repaid from the proceeds of the sales. GILMORE, supra note 22, § 26.1, at
677. Second, authorization may occur through judicial application of waiver. Waiver
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As a general rule, the "created by his seller" language requires
that the person who created the security interest, the debtor, be the
same person who sells the goods. 44 A careful reading of section 9-
307(1) demonstrates its limited protection for a purchaser of used
goods. For instance, in the problem case set out above, a Florida
debtor sold a tractor to a dealership; this dealership later sold the
tractor to a Montana buyer.4' The Montana buyer took subject to
the encumbrance because the security interest had not been created
by his immediate seller, the dealer."
III. JUDICIAL COMMENTARY ON BUYER PROTECTION
Because of the limited application of section 9-307(1), anyone
who buys goods subject to a security interest not created by his
immediate seller will take subject to a remote encumbrance.47 A
nonmerchant buyer of used merchandise, therefore, will rarely
qualify under section 9-307(1), although fair treatment of buyers
would warrant consistent protection for purchasers of both new
arises when a merchant's past sales violated the terms of a security agreement and the
secured creditor failed to object. The creditor is seen to have relinquished its right to
demand further compliance. First Tennessee Production Credit Ass'n v. Gold Kist, Inc.,
653 S.W.2d 418, 421, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1377, 1380 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1983). The relationship between section 9-307(1) and section 9-306(2) has been explained
as follows:
[O]nce a security interest latches on to a piece of collateral, it stays with that
piece of collateral, come what may. All very good for the secured party, but
what about all the unfortunates who had the bad luck of having bought the
asset from the debtor?
[Section 9-306(2)] provides that where the sale is "authorized," as it routinely
is with the inventory loan, the creditor's security interest is severed on the
sale-a rule that is as sane as it is necessary.
Suppose the sale is not authorized... [s]o then the buyer takes subject to the
security interest? He does not; 9-307(1) now snaps into place and severs the
security interest.
QUINN, supra note 20, $ 9-307[A], at 9-187 (1978).
44. Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman Oklahoma, 565 P.2d 26,
30, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1026, 1031 (Okla. 1977).
45. See supra notes 1, 3-7 and accompanying text.
46. Exchange Bank, 180 Mont. at 38, 588 P.2d at 1009, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) at 881.
47. See, e.g., Garbarino v. American Bank & Trust Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 448, 34
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (1982), involving a plaintiff who purchased a used car
in good faith from a recognized automobile dealer. Id. at 449, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 330. The plaintiff did not take free of the security interest created by the
former owner of the car because the interest had not been created by the immediate seller,
the dealer, as required by section 9-307(1). Id. at 450, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
at 330.
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and used goods. Application of the rules seems illogical;48 a mere
matter of fortuity-buying from one seller and not another-bars
protection.49 Common sense and practicality dictate that nonmer-
chant purchasers receive some special consideration, since such
buyers' understanding of security interests is usually poor.5 0 Rec-
ognizing the buyer's dilemma, the Alabama Supreme Court
commented:
[I]t would be impractical to expect buyers to search through the
records of financing statements every time they purchased an
item,.. . it would likewise be unacceptable to put the risk of loss
on the purchaser when the seller defaults on a loan supported by
a security interest in the goods. The secured party is in a better
position to look out for himself in this situation than is the
buyer. 51
The lender is more sophisticated than the buyer, and is in a bet-
ter position to both absorb and prevent loss. 52 It remains unclear,
therefore, why section 9-307 protects lender investment to the
point where some good faith buyers are forced to become unwilling
loan guarantors and, in essence, to assume the credit supervision
48. The Illinois Appellate Court in Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill.
App. 3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1749 (4th Dist. 1982),
stated:
We recognize that the result which flows from this construction of the statute
may seem unjust. The buyer who purchases goods from a seller who has cre-
ated the security interest takes free of that interest even though the buyer could
conceivably discover the existence of a security interest by a title search. When
a security interest exists in favor of a remote seller, however, that same buyer
will not take the goods free and clear of the security interest, even though the
burden of locating the remote party's interest is much greater.
Id. at 290, 440 N.E.2d at 325, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1752-53 (emphasis
added).
49. Professor Charles Knapp suggested that the "created by his seller" limitation
should be deleted from section 9-307(l). "[T]he risks inherent in the business of money-
lending should be borne by money-lenders, not by innocent buyers in the marketplace."
Knapp, Protecting the Buyer of Previously Encumbered Goods: Another Plea for Revision
of U.CC. Section 9.307(1), 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 892 (1973). Because the security inter-
est would be cut off upon any sale of the collateral, deletion of the "created by his seller"
limitation would severely limit inventory financing. This author believes that such a pro-
posal would never be accepted by the secured lending industry.
50. Nonmerchant purchasers do not understand the mechanics of filing; it is fatuous
to assume they will check Article 9 filings. Dugan, supra note 12, at 362-63 n.103.
51. First Dallas County Bank, 425 So. 2d at 466-67, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
at 704 (citing R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS § 5-4 (1977)).
52. "[T]he risks involved. . . should be placed on the inventory financer .... because
it is better able to guard against those risks than the unwary buyer .... " Farmers State
Bank v. Webel, 113 111. App. 3d 87, 95, 446 N.E.2d 525, 530, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 319, 327 (4th Dist. 1983) (citing Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 475, 480-81, 392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (3d Dist. 1979)).
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that belongs to the lender, who is presumably making a profit from
the loan." Perceiving the lender's superior position, the Indiana
Supreme Court expressed the need to protect certain purchasers
against loss. 54 The Indiana Court stated:
It would lead to serious and evil consequences if courts should be
powerless to do or say anything. .. [with] unjust and oppressive
laws, calculated to prejudice legitimate enterprise and create ab-
surd situations .... [It] would be manifestly unjust, inequitable,
and oppressive since no one could safely buy anything whatever
from a retail establishment without first making a search of the
county recorder's office to make certain that it was not encum-
bered with a chattel mortgage, or by seeing that the purchase
price was paid to the mortgagee. 5
More recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the
plight of the nonmerchant buyer:
Ordinarily, when a person goes into a merchant's place of busi-
ness to make a purchase, whether it be of an automobile, a televi-
sion set, a washing machine, or a pound of nails, the purchaser
ought to have the right to assume that the merchant has a right
to sell the commodity in question and should not be required to
make a record search .... 56
53. Food Security Act, H.R. REP. No. 99-271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in
1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1213.
54. Helms v. American Security Co., 216 Ind. 1, 22 N.E.2d 822 (1939).
55. Id. at 5, 8-9, 22 N.E.2d at 824-25.
56. Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma, 565 P.2d 26, 31, 21
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1026, 1032 (Okla. 1977) (quoting Texas National Bank of
Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 1964)).
Although a buyer may utaknowingly purchase encumbered property, the concept of
entrustment under Article 2 may offer a nonmerchant buyer protection from a creditor's
security interest. Entrustment has been successfully invoked in several cases. See, e.g.,
Milnes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 377 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Litchfield v. Dueitt, 245 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1971); Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter,
733 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1987). The entrustment provisions are set forth below, as well as
the reasons why some courts find entrustment should not apply to Article 9.
U.C.C. section 2-403 provides:
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business.
(3) 'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of
possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the de-
livery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the en-
trusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
U.C.C. § 2-403(2), (3) (1978). The entrustment statute contemplates that a secured party
will be estopped from claiming rights in the collateral when it has left the collateral in the
hands of a merchant. In re Woods, 25 Bankr. at 932, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
at 267-68. A buyer will naturally assume the merchant can sell his goods free of any
1987]
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Legislatures, however, have ignored these courts' words.
In light of past and present cases, it would be naive to assume
that the Drafters of Article 9 did not anticipate the sale of used
goods to nonmerchant buyers. Present inequities perhaps reflect
an uneven compromise between some buyer interests and lender
investment. 7 Peter Coogan, consultant to the Review Committee
on the 1978 Amendments to the Code, suggested to the Committee
that some problems were passed over in ignorance, "but there were
many that we passed over fully aware of the fact that we could
have done something if our instructions had allowed us to do it.""8
Although "sleeping dogs were allowed to lie," Mr. Coogan indi-
cated, "they will wake up some day, and then in the next revision
of Article 9, we probably will have to address ourselves to some of
the problems our Committee passed over. ' 59
IV. PROPOSAL
In view of the problems nonmerchant buyers face under current
security interest and should be able to rely on that assumption unless the circumstances
become too suspicious. Id.
There are questions, however, about the relationship between Articles 9 and 2. It has
been held that if a buyer cannot prevail under section 9-307(1), he cannot escape a secur-
ity interest under the entrustment section 2-403. See, e.g., In re Woods, 25 Bankr. 924,
35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 256 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Commercial Credit
Equipment Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 675 (1980); National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1021 (1967). In National Shawmut Bank, 108 N.H. at 389,
236 A.2d at 486, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cailaghan) at 1024, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court provided three reasons why section 2-403 should not apply to Article 9. First,
Article 9, section 9-306(2) states that a security interest will continue "except where this
Article otherwise provides," thereby limiting any exceptions to those contained in Article
9 itself. Second, Article 2, section 2-403(4) provides that the rights of lien creditors are
governed solely by Article 9. Finally, Article 2, section 2-402(3)(a) contains the strongest
prohibition, "nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of
the seller under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9)."
U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) (1978). It is difficult to conceive of a situation more devastating to
a security interest than allowing a buyer to take free under the doctrine of entrustment.
Professor Summers asks about section 2-403: "may a subsequent purchaser disap-
pointed under 9-307 fall back on 2-403 and argue that it renders him superior to a prior
security interest? We believe the answer is no and we think the cases holding to the
contrary are in error." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 43, § 25-15, at 1073. This author
agrees and has, therefore, deliberately left section 2-403 out of the Article 9 buyer protec-
tion analysis. Absent clearer legislative authority, Article 2 should not determine Article
9 buyer-secured party conflicts.
57. GILMORE, supra note 22, § 26.1, at 678. "Much ingenuity has gone into the
drafting of clauses in the inventory security agreement which, it is hoped, will improve
the lender's position if, as a last resort in a hopeless situation, he is forced to go against
such a buyer." Id.
58. COOGAN supra note 12, § 3AA.04, at 3AA-7.
59. Id.
U.C.C. Buyer Protection
section 9-307(1), some changes are necessary. A recent federal
statute, the Food Security Act of 1985 (the "Food Security Act" or
the "Act"),' alters section 9-307(l).6 1 Unfortunately, the Act only
requires notification of security interests in farm products.62 This
Comment proposes a requirement of buyer notification which in-
cludes nonmerchant purchasers of used goods.
A. The Food Security Act of 1985
Under section 9-307(1), a buyer of goods who buys in the ordi-
nary course of business takes free of a security interest created by
his immediate seller.6 3 An exception in section 9-307(1) denies
protection to buyers of farm products. 64 Buyers of farm products
are not protected because security interests created by farmers con-
tinue to encumber the collateral after sale. 5 The rationale under-
lying the farm products exception is that buyers of these products
are sophisticated enough to know that their seller may have
granted a security interest in the property.6 Another justification
is that the exception encourages financing using crops as collat-
eral.67 Whatever the explanation, the farm products exception has
been criticized. 68 Many states responded with the creation of non-
uniform variations of section 9-307(1), ranging from enacting sec-
60. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. 111 1985).
61. H.R. REP. No. 99-271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1212. See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
62. H.R. REP. No. 99-271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 1212-13.
63. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
64. The farm products exception of section 9-307(1) states: "A buyer in the ordinary
course of business.., other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest . . . ." U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978) (em-
phasis added). As a matter of statutory congruity, "farm products" should be excluded
from section 9-307(1). Section 9-307(1) applies primarily to the sale of inventory. See
supra note 40. Because section 9-109(3) states that "farm products" are not inventory,
section 9-307(1) cannot govern farm products. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1978). For the rele-
vant provision of section 9-109(3), see supra note 15.
65. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978). See, e.g., Baker Production Credit Ass'n, 266 Or. 643,
513 P.2d 1129, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 531 (1973). See also, E. REILEY,
GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.09, at 13-34 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter REILEY].
66. HAWKLAND, supra note 16, § 9-307:03, at 76.
67. Richards, Federal Preemption of the U. C.C Farm Products Exception: Buyers
Must Still Beware, 15 STETSON L. REV. 371, 376 (1986).
68. REILEY, supra note 65, § 13.09, at 13-34 (the farm products exception has
spawned a huge volume of litigation); 69 AM. JUR. 2D Secured Transactions § 470, at 331
n.70 (1973) (the farm products exception leads to the absurd result that a person who
buys a dozen eggs from a farmer takes them subject to a perfected security interest, while
a person who buys the same eggs from a retail store takes them free of such a security
interest); GILMORE, supra note 22, § 26.10, at 707 (rightly or wrongly, and for reasons
1987]
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tion 9-307(1) without the farm products exception, to imposing
criminal penalties on farm sellers who fail to disclose the existence
of a security interest to a buyer.6 9 These variations defeat the pur-
pose of a Uniform Commercial Code.
In an attempt to restore uniformity and expand farm purchaser
protection, the federal government responded with the Food Secur-
ity Act. 0 The operative language of the Act provides:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local
law, a buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys a farm
product from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take
free of a security interest created by the seller, even though the
security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of the existence
of such security interest.7'
Under the federal law, in a complete reversal of prior practices, a
buyer of farm products will now take free of a security interest
created by his immediate seller.' 2 A buyer of farm products will
purchase encumbered property only if one of two conditions has
been satisfied. First, a buyer will take property subject to a lien if
the secured party or seller has sent written notice of the security
interest to the buyer within one year from the date purchase.' 3
Second, a buyer will purchase property subject to a security inter-
est if the buyer failed to register with the Secretary of State in those
States which have established a central filing system.'4
Under the first condition, the lender must provide notice of its
security interest to potential buyers of the collateral. 7' The lender
learns of these buyers through a buyer list supplied by the debtor.' 6
The statute imposes a $5,000 fine (or 15% of the value of the prod-
ucts sold, whichever is greater) against a debtor who engages in
which are never precisely articulated, the farm financer comes off much better than the
inventory financer).
69. See, e.g., CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9307(1) (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 336.9-307(1) (West Supp. 1987) (deletion of "other than a person buying farm
products from a person engaged in farming operations"). See also, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, para. 9-307.2 (1985) (selling agent must post written warning to inform buyers that
they are to make payments to the secured party; failure to post warning subjects the
selling agent to criminal penalties).
70. H.R. REP. No. 99-271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1213.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
72. See generally Fry, Buying Farm Products: The 1985 Farm Bill Changes the Rules
of the Game, 91 COM. L.J. 433 (1986).
73. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
74. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
75. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
76. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
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"off-list" selling. 7" Somewhat at a disadvantage, the lender must
depend on the honesty of its debtor, and the fine, without more,
may not be enough to compel compliance.7 8
Under the second condition, the State sets up a central filing
system, whereby filings are forwarded periodically to buyers of
farm products who have registered with the Secretary of State. 9
The statute contemplates an additional filing system that is sepa-
rate from the U.C.C.80 Lenders must file in one system to protect
their interest against bona fide purchasers, and file again under the
U.C.C. to preserve their interest against other creditors. 81 Of
greater concern, however, is that the Secretary of State is only re-
quired to distribute a copy of the master list as prescribed by the
State itself.8 2 If a purchaser buys between the regular distributions
of the list and fails to receive notice, the lien will be cut off. 83 The
secured lender is therefore at the mercy of the Secretary of State.
B. Section 9-307(1) Proposal
This Comment's amendment to section 9-307(1) is based on the
Food Security Act and the existing state farm statutes. The propo-
sal contemplates that notice of some creditor interests be sent to
nonmerchant buyers before purchase of encumbered collateral.
9-307(1): A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9)
of Section 1-20 1) [deletion offarm provision] takes free of a secur-
ity interest created by his seller even though the security interest
is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence. A
buyer in ordinary course of business, other than a person who buys
goods intended for resale, also takes free of any other security in-
terest, even though the security interest is perfected, unless prior to
purchase, the secured party or the seller has given written notice of
the security interest to the buyer.14
77. Id.
78. Comptroller of the Currency Rules on Secured Agricultural Loans, 3 Secured
Lending Alert (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) No. 1, at 2-3 (Mar. 1987).
79. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1985).
80. Letter from Goodman, Schneider & Cohen (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) to Cor-
porate General Counsel, Associates Commercial Corporation (Chicago, Illinois) (Nov.
12, 1986) (discussing lending procedures under the Food Security Act).
81. Id.
82. REILEY, supra note 65, § 13.10[l], at 13-38.
83. Id. at 13-39.
84. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d)-(e)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-
307(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-307(4) (1985); IND. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-9-307(1)(a) (Burns/Michie Supp. 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-
307(4) (Michie Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9307(5), (10) (West Supp.
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-307(2)(a)-(d) (Michie Supp. 1986).
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(a) Written notice must contain the name and address of the
person indebted to the secured party, the name, address, and tele-
phone number of the secured party from which information con-
cerning the security interest may be obtained, and may contain
other information so as to reasonably inform the buyer of the se-
curity interest.8 5
(b) If written notice is sent by mail, it shall be sent by regis-
tered or certified mail. 6
(c) Any person selling to a buyer in ordinary course of business
is obligated to provide the secured lender with the name and ad-
dress of any buyer or potential buyer when requested by the se-
cured party.8
7
(d) If the sale is to a buyer other than one for which the se-
cured party has received notice, the seller must notify the secured
party within 7 days after sale, and if required, account for the pro-
ceeds of such sale."'
(e) Any person who sells to a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness and fails to comply with this section shall be liable to the se-
cured party for any loss resulting from the sale. 9 A seller's failure
to comply with this section may result in imprisonment of not more
than 60 days, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both per viola-
tion.90 If a secured party can prove by competent evidence that it
has sustained a monetary loss and is unable to collect under the
security agreement, the secured party is entitled to as much of the
fine as is necessary to cover the loss."
The proposed amendment to section 9-307(1) does not seek to
prevent creditors from pursuing collateral; the amendment merely
requires notification so that a buyer of used goods may make an
informed choice as to whether he will assume the risk of debtor
default and repossession before buying encumbered merchandise.
Furthermore, notification is not necessary in every sale. Dealer or
merchant purchasers, those who buy collateral intended for resale,
need not be notified. Nonmerchant purchasers need be notified
only when a creditor believes the collateral will maintain sufficient
value as used goods so that repossession would be commercially
85. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (Supp. III 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-
9-307(l)(a)(i)-(ii) (Burns/Michie Supp. 1986).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-307(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 26, para. 9-307(4) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-307(4) (Michie Supp. 1986).
87. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
88. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
89. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-307(3)(e) (West Supp. 1987).
90. See 7 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3) (Supp. III 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 440.9307(4) (West Supp. 1986).
91. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9307(5)(a) (West Supp. 1986).
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practical. Recognizing that the buyer stands to lose, it is not exact-
ing to require a disclosure from a creditor who wishes to maintain
the option of repossession in the future.
In essence, the proposal shifts the burden of policing the collat-
eral and the risk of loss from a buyer to a secured lender. As a
trade-off, the proposal provides some benefits for the lender. First,
in keeping with current law, the secured party is still entitled to
proceeds when the debtor sells the collateral. 2 Second, if there is a
deficiency, anyone who sells in violation of the lender's interest will
be liable to the secured lender for any loss resulting from the sale.
Accordingly, the secured creditor may base a cause of action di-
rectly on the new Code and avoid any problem a court may have in
applying common law conversion.93 Third, and most advanta-
geous to lenders, the proposal provides state enforced sanctions,
imprisonment and a fine, to discourage sales in violation of a se-
cured creditor's rights in the collateral. If a secured party can
prove by competent evidence that it has sustained a monetary loss
and is unable to collect under the security agreement, the secured
party is entitled to as much of the fine as is necessary to cover the
loss. 94 The secured lender thereby benefits from the State's action
and expense in bringing the lawsuit against the seller.
V. ANALYSIS
The proposal enables a nonmerchant buyer to take free of any
security interests, including those created by one other than the
buyer's immediate seller. If a lender is to protect its interests, it (or
the buyer's immediate seller) must provide the buyer with written
notice of the security interest. This written notice requirement has
two elements.
A. Notice to Secured Lender
The first element of the proposal requires that notice be sent to
the secured lender by the debtor of the collateral. The debtor must
furnish the lender with the name of a buyer or potential buyer if
requested. This information may be in the form of a "buyer list."
A "buyer list" is a schedule of all names and addresses of buyers
with whom the debtor deals. The lender should obtain a list of
buyers from the debtor as a condition of extending credit and
92. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978). See supra note 43.
93. Dugan, supra note 12, at 356-61 (explanation of when an auctioneer may be liable
for conversion).
94. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9307(5)(a) (West Supp. 1986).
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should require a constant update of the buyer list. 95
The goods become "used goods" when the collateral is sold by
the debtor. If the debtor sells to a dealer, this dealer or the lender
itself must provide notice of the lender's security interest to any
nonmerchant purchaser in a subsequent sale. The lender could as-
sure that a purchaser receives notice by sending a strongly worded
warning to the dealer. For example,
"YOUR FAILURE TO ENABLE THE LENDER TO GIVE
NOTICE, OR YOUR FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE TO A
BUYER OF OUR SECURITY INTEREST IS A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 9-307(1) OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF
THIS STATE, AND MAY RESULT IN SEVERE SANC-
TIONS AGAINST YOU. UNDER SECTION 9-307(l), YOU
MAY ALSO BE LIABLE TO US FOR ANY LOSS RESULT-
ING FROM A SALE UNLESS NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN
GIVEN."
A warning of the specific Code sanctions should compel
compliance.
96
B. Notice to Buyer
The second element of the proposal is a notice requirement to
the nonmerchant buyer. Either the lender or the seller must pro-
vide adequate notice to the buyer apprising him of the security in-
terest in the collateral that he is about to purchase. Not unfairly,
the dealer, who is presumably making a profit from the sale, is
asked to assist the lender in providing buyer notification.
To simplify paperwork, the lender may supply the dealer with a
form using standardized language or a sticker to be affixed on the
collateral so that the buyer is informed of the creditor's lien. For
example:
* * * NOTICE TO BUYER * * *
THIS MERCHANDISE IN THE POSSESSION OF DEALER
IS SUBJECT TO A SECURITY INTEREST HELD BY FI-
NANCE CORP. IN THE EVENT OF A DEFAULT BY
95. The purpose of buyer lists is to enable the lender to trace collateral and provide
notice of the security interest when a nonmerchant buyer potentially arises in the chain of
title.
96. The imprisonment sanction may at first appear overly harsh. The threat of a dis-
cretionary imprisonment sanction may be necessary because of the insufficiency of a fine
in some cases. For example, a buyer may be willing to pay more for a large piece of
equipment if he could take free of the encumbering security interest. A dealer would then
weigh the $10,000 fine against his enhanced profit, and if he comes out ahead, he would
find it in his economic best interest to violate section 9-307. The added sanction of im-
prisonment should force most dealers to comply with the Code.
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DEBTOR, 816 DEARBORN ST. CHICAGO, IL. 60610, FI-
NANCE CORP. MAY HAVE THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE
POSSESSION AND MAY FORECLOSE ON ITS INTEREST
WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS. YOU ARE ADVISED TO
CONTACT FINANCE CORP., 555 MICHIGAN AVENUE,
CHICAGO, IL. 60601 1-800-123-4567. 97
In a dispute challenging the sufficiency of notice, a court would
look to whether the notice satisfied certain requirements. These
requirements might be that the notice was written and conspicu-
ous, that the notice would induce a reasonable buyer to inquire,
and that the notice gave the name, address and telephone number
of the lender, so that information could be verified before a
purchase. Incidentally, buyer contact would also aid the lender
because it would be alerted of a sale and the existence of proceeds,
where applicable.
C. Buyer's Options to Protect His Interest
After receiving notice of a security interest, the buyer's greatest
leverage may arise through his refusal to purchase the encumbered
collateral unless he can be assured that the goods being sold can be
bought free and clear of the creditor's interest. In order to effectu-
ate a sale, the creditor, dealer, and buyer could agree that the se-
curity interest will be satisfied using the proceeds from the
imminent sale of the collateral. The buyer would name the secured
lender and dealer as joint payees when the product is bought to
assure that the lender receives payment and that the lien on the
property is discharged. 98
If the debtor is not in default (which is discovered when contact
is made with the lender named in the notice), the buyer might ob-
tain a partial release or waiver from the secured lender or seek a
subordination agreement, which would declare the buyer's rights
in the collateral superior to those of the creditor. A creditor would
be willing to subordinate its interest because a sale results in pro-
ceeds, which puts the creditor in a position to receive repayment of
97. Some state Retail Installment Sales Acts require contract terms and disclosures in
certain size typeface to advise buyers of warranties, interest rates, and rights to redeem
property if repossessed. See, e.g,, Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PER-
SONAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 301-315 (McKinney 1977); Retail Installment Sales Act,
N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 401-422 (McKinney 1977). This Comment's pro-
posal amends section 9-307(1) directly. Alternatively, section 9-307(1) might be amended
indirectly by altering Installment Sales Acts which govern U.C.C. Article 9.
98. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-307(l)(d) (Burns/Michie Supp. 1986); IowA
CODE ANN. § 554.9307(4) (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-28(11) (Supp. 1985).
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its loan.99 If the security interest is no longer in effect, a prudent
buyer should require the creditor to file a termination statement. 100
If for some reason the above options prove unworkable, the
buyer is always free to go elsewhere and buy unencumbered prod-
ucts. Should he choose to buy the encumbered collateral, he does
so with the knowledge of the security interest.' 0'
D. Application of the Proposal to a Particular Case
The following situation demonstrates how the proposal would
operate to protect the nonmerchant buyer. In Commercial Credit
Equipment Corp. v. Bates,0 2 the debtor bought a tractor for use in
his business from a dealer, Faircloth International.' 0 The debtor
granted a security interest to the Commercial Credit Equipment
Corp. ("C.C.E.C."). 0 4 The debtor had no immediate use for the
tractor, and so leased it to Anderson for use in his business (Ander-
99. QUINN, supra note 20, $ 9-307[A][1], at S9-295 (Supp. 1 1987).
100. U.C.C. § 9-404(1) provides:
[w]henever there is no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to
make advances, incur obligations or otherwise give value, the secured party
must on written demand by the debtor send the debtor, for each filing officer
with whom the financing statement was filed, a termination statement to the
effect that he no longer claims a security interest under the financing statement,
which shall be identified by file number.
U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1978).
101. Automobiles are treated differently than some other types of collateral because
of Certificate of Title laws. The concept of these title laws is that any ownership right or
security interest is noted on the title certificate. In re Friedman, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 890, 892 (D. Conn. 1967). When the automobile is transferred or sold, the
certificate accompanies it and puts a buyer on notice. Id.
The thought underlying the Certificate of Title Act and the portions of the
Uniform Commercial Code that have been incorporated in it is that there be a
distinctive document, filed in a particular public office and available to the pub-
lic, which establishes the title to each motor vehicle and reveals the security
interests in it. This document and its contents should be that upon which all
can rely with finality as to the title to and encumbrances on a motor vehicle.
Id. One problem with certificates is that an ignorant buyer has the opportunity to see the
certificate only after sale. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 357 So. 2d
651, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 864 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), aff'd, 357 So. 2d 654,
23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 750 (Ala. 1978). Another problem occurs when the
buyer is misled because of a forged satisfaction of a creditor's lien on the certificate. See,
e.g., Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 273 (1970) (citing G.M.A.C. v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964);
Central Fiance Co. v. Garber, 121 Ind. App. 27, 97 N.E.2d 503 (1951)). It is uncertain
what changes might be made within the Certificate of Title laws to remedy these
problems.
102. 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 675 (1980).
103. Id. at 72, 267 S.E.2d at 470, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 675.
104. Id.
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son coincidentally was an employee of the dealership).10 Ander-
son then lent the tractor to Kenneth Faircloth, doing business as
Faircloth International, the dealer. 10 6 Mr. Faircloth performed
some dirt-moving work at his dealership and parked the tractor on
his lot. 10 7 When a buyer in need of the tractor approached Fair-
cloth, he agreed to sell the tractor and falsely informed the buyer
that the tractor was new. 108 The buyer had no knowledge that the
tractor was previously sold.109 Further, assuming the buyer
searched under the name of his seller, Faircloth International, no
financing statement would have been found because no security in-
terest existed against Faircloth. Simple application of section 9-
307(1) required the Georgia Court to find that the buyer took sub-
ject to C.C.E.C.'s security interest." 0 Because Faircloth had not
created the security interest, the "created by his seller" limitation
barred protection for the buyer."'
Under this Comment's proposal, the court would have been able
to reach a far more equitable result. Because it is unlikely under
the facts of this case that the buyer would have received notice, he
would have taken free of C.C.E.C.'s security interest. Faircloth, as
seller, would have been liable to C.C.E.C. Faircloth might also
face a fine and imprisonment. C.C.E.C. would offset its damages
against any fine collected by the State. The proposal mandates that
both C.C.E.C. and the buyer are compensated, and that Faircloth
bear responsibility. Under current law, as the Bates case demon-
strates, Faircloth avoids any liability and the buyer suffers the loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
Article 9 of the U.C.C. assumes that nonmerchant buyers recog-
105. Id. at 72, 267 S.E.2d at 470, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 675-76.
106. Id. at 72, 267 S.E.2d at 470, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 676.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 72, 267 S.E.2d at 470-71, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 676.
109. Id. at 72, 267 S.E.2d at 471, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 676.
110. Id. at 74, 267 S.E.2d at 472, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (callaghan) at 678.
Ill. Id. Under current law, the buyer's recourse in the Bates case may have been to
bring a breach of warranty of title action against Faircloth. U.C.C. section 2-312(1)
provides:
(1) ... there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien
or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no
knowledge.
U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a), (b) (1978). A breach of title suit against the dealer, however, may
be burdensome and costly. The rationale behind the proposal is to avoid forcing a buyer
to litigate in order to obtain clear title on purchased goods.
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nize the existence of filing records and that such buyers understand
the mechanics of filing.' 12 These assumptions unquestioningly re-
quire purchasers of used goods to bear the loss when a creditor
elects to repossess collateral. In view of the existing problems of
nonmerchant purchasers and the logic of buyer notification under
the Food Security Act as a possible solution, section 9-307(1)
should be reexamined. If present-day secured financing transac-
tions are to go forward with greater certainty, 1 3 unwary buyers
must receive notice of creditors' interests before buying encum-
bered property. The new Code proposal is a means for inexpensive
buyer notification.
THOMAS STILP
112. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985) explains: "[C]ertain State laws permit a
secured lender to enforce liens against a purchaser ... even if the purchaser does not
know that the sale of the products violates the lender's security interest in the products,
[and] lacks any practical method for discovering the existence of the security interest
.... d.113. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment, para. 7 (1978).
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